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Can fashion (HatH IIb #215) as permanent revolution (HatH I #463) be interpreted as a "means to real peace" (HatH IIb #284) ?

'Fashion' may be thought of as a permanent concept, applied to particular styles across many different fields of endeavour, over and above the changes that may occur in those styles over time. For instance, dressing in a certain manner may no longer be said to be in fashion, yet the concept itself persists and is applied in like manner to the style of dress succeeding it. Similarly, 'modernity' itself may be seen as a solid concept in itself, despite changes to how and to what it may be applied. Nietzsche highlights though, that while one may use the term 'fashion' as a persistent container term for changes in trends and so on over time, our actual engagement with the term is generally far more superficial. That is to say, we engage with fashion largely at the level of mere change, concerned as it is with class, national and individual distinction - and thus, vanity. Nietzsche therefore posits permanence as integral to his account, with vanity overcome through a personal assertion to cease our infatuation with change. This assertion in turn is reflected in the 'modern' European's perspective on fashion and modernity, in that just as fashion from this standpoint overcomes change for its own sake, modernity is no longer applied simply as an identifier to the latest incarnation of change, but rather serves to describe as 'modern' the societal and cultural backdrop against which a rejection of vanity now takes place. Ultimately, the values underpinning these assertions are reflected in a sort of attitudinal costume, with the fashion-sense informing one's dress flowing from this stance. Nietzsche's comments on revolution also caution against viewing change itself as a valued objective, instead positing the sum total of the outcomes of change over time as valuable. We might then view Nietzsche's perspective on fashion as 'revolution', as the backdrop of modernity remains, with the outcomes of these assertions on fashion assessable against it over time. Insofar as such revolutionary action is undertaken in the spirit of personal assertion, rather than suspicion of where this may leave us positioned in relation to the distinctions underpinning vanity, I take it that the 'means to real peace' has its essence in this perspective.

In order to assess Nietzsche's perspective on fashion with a view to its potential to be taken on as, and with, a kind of 'revolutionary' permanence, we must also be mindful that though we may come to regard this perspective as revolutionising previous conceptions of fashion at the level of vanity and thus a merely superficial outlook on change, it is imperative that this account not be seen as revolutionary in what Nietzsche takes to be the more usual sense of the word. To this end, Nietzsche derides as "political and social fantasists"¹ those who would advocate a complete and immediate overturning of the existing social order. He cites Rousseau in particular as purveying a "superstition"² in asserting that since socio-cultural institutions encapsulated within the State work to bring forth the basest characteristics in human nature, revolution would allow our genuine nature, one of basic goodness, to surface. Further still, Nietzsche holds that revolutionary attempts inspired by views of this kind have, in fact, rekindled "...savage energies"³, manifested through "dreadfulness and excesses of the most-distant ages"⁴. It seems to me that Nietzsche's essential objection to this form of revolution is that though it inspires a passionate fervour amongst its followers, this energy is not of an inspirational or creative form that could be put toward a re-working of those aspects of society deemed to be in need of such attention. Rather, its operation resembles a kind of reflexivity, where 'revolutionary' energies are not poured into some such effort, but rather are used simply to stoke this passionate fervour itself to progressively greater heights. Any claim to a kind of societal rescue-mission, where long-buried goodness is dragged out from under the crushing weight of the 'old order' also seems absurd from this perspective, and indeed "superstitious" as Nietzsche says, since this effectively amounts to designating an aspect of human nature as hidden from view by the prevailing order, and yet simultaneously knowable as hidden, and further still, knowable as inherent goodness, despite it being hidden. We can proceed with certainty, then, in suggesting that whatever might be taken up in Nietzsche's account of fashion and modernity with a view to the perspective we have seen so far as on revolution, it is not to be found in the wholesale overturning of the social order in aide of a miraculous uncovering of that which we already knew to be hidden in advance.

Yet, the closing lines of Nietzsche's largely polemical assertions on the "delusion"⁵ that is for him inherent in the theory of revolution provide an optimistic perspective on what he refers to as "progressive evolution"⁶. I take the term used in this context to provide for a discernable contrast between one state of affairs and another, achieved in such a way as to preserve the essential underlying structures of the 'current' state, with a view to their gradual modification over time, so that eventually, the 'projected' state may well resemble the previous one in only a minimal way. The essential feature at work here, though, is that these underlying structures are not simply thrown out, as it were, with energy instead devoted to a re-crafting of the status quo. Much of this advocacy for a preservation of basic notions and structures as the generator of change rather than an inevitable casualty of it, can be discerned in Nietzsche's assertions on fashion and modernity. Rather than portraying his distinction between "national costume"⁷ and his perspective on fashion as an objective to attain to, Nietzsche instead moves to position the terms involved so that they retain the impetus of their use in the usual sense, whilst also allowing for each to be viewed in what might well be considered a new light. In suggesting, for instance, that fashion from this perspective is to be found "alongside the virtues of present-day Europe",⁸ Nietzsche does not force his reader to envisage some fantastical take on the notion of modernity. After all, there is little else that better invokes the usual connotations of being 'modern' than the present day. However, Nietzsche nonetheless recasts the significance of the term, as we are no longer viewing modernity in relation to merely being 'up-to-date' in relation to arbitrarily determined trend, but rather in a more immediate, perhaps even more genuine sense of the term, so that the scope of discussion now widens to position 'modern fashion' as it were, as a reflection of an understanding of what from Nietzsche's perspective is a much broader 'trend', that of a shift away from the "ignorance, uncleanliness and superstition"⁹ encapsulated in the aforementioned national costume, to its opposites, the virtues encapsulated in fashion. The implication for the notion of 'change' in relation to both of these terms is clear, since to be 'fashionable' from this perspective does not require that one simply change one's dress regularly in order to remain so, but rather that the broader sense of modernity is acknowledged to include, in the context of Nietzsche's writing, the present day, with all of the virtues he takes as being displayed at that time across Europe, such that change is now replaced with a permanence inherent in one's assertion of these values.

It must be said that the notion of permanence I have used as a means of distinguishing Nietzsche's perspective from that of more commonly-held interpretations of fashion and modernity should not be taken on literally, since to do so would distort his account. Nietzsche's perspective need not entail a 'freeze-frame' snapshot of fashion and modernity, where each would remain completely stationary, somehow cut off from everyday existence. Rather, Nietzsche's perspective involves a "repudiation"¹⁰ of vanity, and thus an end to an idolisation of change, insofar as this comes to represent a mere following of an exhortation toward change, which might be seen as inherent in traditional renderings of fashion and modernity where staying 'in fashion' or 'in style' is automatically associated with changing in order to be seen as such. Such a position, then, is actually constitutive of an opposition to a 'pausing' of modernity and fashion, since in repudiating what might be termed popular conceptions of each, we are actually allowing ourselves to view the world beyond a perception of it that is to a large degree, at least potentially, tethered to the interconnecting conception of one's self as perceived in relation to, and reflected in vanity, and the continual necessity of change fuelled by it. It is in this rejection, and the means to a revaluation of fashion and modernity contained therein, that I take the 'permanence' I have enunciated so far to reside in Nietzsche's account. Following from this assertive permanence, as it were, the values that inform and reflect it also exude a sense of general solidity, in that they draw on the spirit in which one selects and wears one's clothing, meaning that we are not restricted to some singular and eternal dress option, but rather that our potential choices are informed by this mindset. Nietzsche therefore posits the characteristics of wearers themselves as centrally important, asserting that the "industrious"¹¹ man, with an overriding concern for the "work he has to do"¹² is representative of this mindset. While I do not intend to overshadow the face-value aspects of these characteristics, as it were, insofar as they may be seen as reflective of a modern, industrious Europe, in the context of the aspects of fashion I have addressed so far in this account, we might also take these attributes as further contributions to Nietzsche's broader position. That is to say, if one is completely entrenched in a fashion-driven perspective along the lines Nietzsche is rejecting, then they will give consideration only to the demands of fashion and its accompanying connection with change, rather than the practical requirements of everyday life. For instance, one who values wearing the latest in footwear simply because it is the latest 'in fashion', over the requirements of one's occupation, cannot possibly be considered to be a proponent of Nietzsche's perspective, since their preoccupation ultimately refers them once again to vanity.

If we now draw together Nietzsche's comments on revolution - characterised by a rejection of wholesale, unguided revolution, and his advocacy instead for a re-crafting leading ultimately to change as inspired by passionate creativity - along with his comments on fashion, including a rejection of change viewed as an end in itself, and a re-examination of fashion and modernity, we may justifiably interpret fashion in Nietzsche's re-cast perspective as the kind of "progressive evolution" we have so far discussed, and thus as a kind of 'permanent revolution'. Having suggested that contained in turn in this perspective may be the 'means to real peace', I shall attempt to show how features of both conceptions may ultimately function coherently alongside one another. Nietzsche presents us with a view of international 'relations' where all nations "presuppose an evil disposition in their neighbour and a benevolent predisposition in themselves".¹³ This assertion seems to me to be cognate with the psychological underpinnings of vanity we saw earlier, wherein a mutual suspicion between parties is established around a presupposition to a right to the 'high-ground' in relation to fashion for oneself, and a contrasting un-fashionable envisagement of another, with this holding vice-versa for the other party. The link between the aphorism on fashion and this, is further underscored given that Nietzsche, as we have seen, posits the national costume as one of the key reflections of vanity. Given this, I regard Nietzsche's assertion that disarmament could, albeit in a highly idealised scenario, arise not out of a begrudgingly made concession, filled with a tense paranoia about where one nation would then be positioned in relation to another, but out of an "elevated sensibility"¹⁴ as having reciprocal implications for both aphorisms, in that an assertion against the initial conceptions of fashion and modernity we began with also necessarily involves this outlook. I argue then, given the reciprocal reflections in the aphorisms we have discussed here, that fashion as permanent revolution is inherently imbued with the same assertive structure ultimately manifested in the means to real peace.

I have argued here for a conception of three of Nietzsche's aphorisms from Human, all too Human where their individual perspectives on their respective areas of inquiry are preserved, but also establishes the possibility of viewing the three aphorisms as ultimately capable of blending or intermingling. To that end, I have attempted to proceed from a rejection of revolution as simply a wholesale overturning of societal structures purely in order to further fan the flames, as it were, of revolutionary fervour itself, and have tried to show how echoes of Nietzsche's proposed alternative of a guided reconfiguration over time may be discovered in his views on fashion and modernity, where the fetishising of change is a goal or object of value in its own right would cease, and modernity in a revised light would be open to us as a backdrop against which such 'progressive evolution' would take place. I have further argued that fashion, as a reflection of this mindset, may therefore be viewed as a kind of permanent 'revolution', as distinct from the notion we have rejected, and that the essential underpinnings of these concepts, when taken together, reflect the 'means to real peace' Nietzsche writes of, where just as one would relinquish an attachment to change and vanity with regard to fashion, one would disarm out of a genuinely-held volition as opposed to a lingering suspicion of where this would leave us positioned, whether on the level of individual or national concern.

Bibliography

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Human, all too Human. (Trans. R.J Hollingdale) Cambridge University Press, 1996